代写论文:自我保护

代写论文:自我保护

根据斯坦(1982)的说法,政权是为了自我保护而形成的。这被称为作者背后的古典目的。因此基本上,国际政策的协作和协调是为了保护自身的利益。有趣的是,这种非常自私的利益使得即使是个人复杂。个人并不总是遵循一些具有特定规则的正常行为。正如博弈理论的工作所暗示的那样,多年来在关系中形成的复杂的互动和动态更加复杂,或者长时间演奏的游戏将会产生更多的相互关联的行为。正如斯坦(Stein,1982)所述,每个参与者都将努力实现一套特定的偏好和规则,而这些偏好和规则实际上是基于这些偏好进行协调的。

代写论文:自我保护
现在这种理解与广泛的游戏形式类似。国际状态确实是在他们的互动中做出选择和决定的演员。它们形成了长期的互动,就像为广泛的游戏形式假设的那样。他们根据他们的对手(斯坦因(1982),演员是互动状态)在过去做出的选择做出决定。因此,在选择和决定中进行合作或协调。就偏好达成一致意见将导致两个行为者在一些互利的理解上工作,因此,他们过去的选择有利于他们目前的选择。从长远来看,两者都有好处。因此,广泛的游戏形式有助于理解斯坦因(Stein,1982)提出的制度的协调与合作。

代写论文:自我保护

Regimes, according to Stein (1982), are formed for the purpose of self-preservation. This is called as the classical purpose behind their formation by authors. Thus basically, international policies collaboration and coordination are to protect self-interests. It is interesting that this very self-interest is what makes even individuals complex. Individual do not always follow some normal behaviour with a given set of specific rules. As the Game theory work suggests, there are much more complex interactions and dynamics formed in relationships over years, or a game played over a longer time will have much more interconnected actions. As Stein (1982) states, each of the actor will work towards a specific set of preferences and rules which are in fact coordinated based on those preferences.

代写论文:自我保护
Now this understanding is similar to the extensive game form. International states are indeed actors who have choices and decisions to make in their interactions. They form long term interactions just like the one assumed for the extensive game form. They make decisions based on the choices that their opposite partner (in the case of Stein (1982), the actors are interactional states) has made in the past. A collaboration or coordination in choices and decisions hence happens. Agreed upon preferences will lead both actors to work on some mutually beneficial understanding and hence, their past choices are conducive to their present choices. Both benefit in the long run. Extensive game form hence is helpful in understanding the coordination and collaboration in regimes that Stein (1982) presents.