essay代写:中国投资管理

essay代写:中国投资管理

中国资本市场缺乏有效的基金经理激励机制,是基金绩效问题的核心。除了治理结构的缺陷外,我国现行基金经理薪酬制度也是基金经理无法通过这种方式实现投资者利益最大化的重要原因之一。我国《基金法》规定,基金管理人的报酬,按1.5%的年利率按基金资产净值年底计提管理年费。但事实上,目前的股票基金管理费是1.5%的年提成率。开放式基金还有1.5%左右的额外认购费和0.5%的赎回费。如果算上一年期银行存款利率,投资者购买该基金的机会成本接近5%。这意味着基金规模越大,提取的管理费越多,基金经理的收入就越高。因此,这种薪酬方式并不能清晰地反映基金经理的投资管理能力。基金经理的薪酬只取决于基金的规模,即使盈利能力较低,即使给基金投资者造成损失,基金经理仍可亮出管理费。在缺乏风险激励的情况下,基金经理的薪酬与风险责任不对称导致基金经理缺乏盈利动机。

基金经理是投资基金运作的关键人员。近年来,我国基金业“羊群效应”和“黑屏”现象频繁发生,表明我国基金业存在着较为松散的制衡约束和监管体系。因此,运用激励机制来保护利益相关者的利益,避免基金经理的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”就显得尤为重要。本文选择基金经理激励机制作为研究对象,具有重要的理论和现实意义。

essay代写:中国投资管理

首先,对绝对绩效激励契约和相对绩效激励契约进行理论分析。其次,利用多维线性回归模型研究了基金管理费的激励效应。第三,通过建立0,1两个分类变量,运用Logistic回归模型分析基金经理职业声望的激励效应。最后,运用相对绩效排序方法研究了基金经理的风险选择。根据理论分析和实证分析的结论,提出了基金经理激励机制的设计和完善方案,并提出了保障基金经理激励机制发挥有益作用的建议。

风险管理基金资产就像资本市场上的其他基金一样增值。从历史上看,它们提供了不对称的回报,并允许投资者以高回报率获得复合资本。股票风险降低,并在控制下跌时提供高回报。这也支撑了对冲基金的增值交付。通常,当考虑投资并回顾投资记录时,分析是基于净收益而不是费用总额。一些最优秀的基金经理甚至收取3%的管理费和30%的绩效费,但他们也有望将年净回报率提高到10%。那些基于费用拖累而不是关注投资者净回报来筛选经理人的中介公司,也可能会错失专业技能。

essay代写:中国投资管理

The lack of effective fund manager incentives is seen in Chinese capital markets, which lie at the core of the problem of fund performance. In addition to the governance structure of the defect, China current fund manager remuneration system is an important reason for the fund managers cannot maximize the interests of investors by the way to operate. China ‘Fund Law’ stipulates that the fund managers’ compensation, 1.5% annual rate by the end of the fund’s net asset value accrued management annual fee. However, in fact, the current stock fund management fee is 1.5% annual rate of extraction. Open-end funds have an additional subscription fee of about 1.5% and 0.5% redemption fee. If you count the one-year bank savings interest rates, the opportunity cost of investors to buy the fund is close to 5%. This means that the larger the fund, the more extracted management fees, fund manager’s income is higher. Therefore, this remuneration way does not clearly reflect fund manager’s investment management capabilities. The fund manager’s remuneration depends only on the size of the fund, even if profitability is low, even to fund investors caused a loss, managers can still shine mention management fee. In the case of such a lack of risk incentives, fund manager’s remuneration and risk liability asymmetry leading fund managers who lack motivation of profit.

Fund managers are the key persons in the operation of an investment fund. Recently, “herd behaviour” and “black screen” are frequent in the fund industry in China which indicate that there are loose systems of balance constrains and supervision. Therefore, it is important to apply an incentive mechanism to protect the interest of stakeholders, avoid “reversion choice” and “moral risk” among fund managers. We choose the incentive mechanism of fund managers as our research subject, which has great theoretical and practical significance.

essay代写:中国投资管理

Firstly, we carry on the theoretical analysis to the absolute performance incentive contract and the relative performance incentive contract. Secondly, we utilize the multi-dimensional linear regression models to study the incentive effect of fund management fee. Thirdly, we would analyze professional prestige of fund managers’ incentive effect using the Logistic regression models by establishing 0, 1 two classified variables. And finally, we study the fund managers’ risk choice by the relative performance sorting. According to the conclusions of theoretical and empirical analysis, we put forward the design and the consummation plans about the incentive mechanism of fund managers, and bring forward some suggestion to safeguard fund manager’s incentive mechanism to display useful effects.

Risk managed fund assets add to value just like other funds in capital market. Historically, they provide asymmetric returns and allow investors to a compounded capital at high rate of return. Equity risk is reduced, and provides high returns when controlling downside. This has also underpinned value added delivery of hedge funds as well. Usually when an investment is considered and track record reviewed, the analysis is made based upon net returns rather than gross of fees. Some of the best managers go as far as charging 3% management and 30% performance fees, yet they are also expected to compound annual returns to 10% net. Intermediaries firms that screen out managers based upon fee drag rather than focusing on the net return to investors also might miss out on expertise.