Quine argues that all the mathematical sentences and theorems are ontologically committed to mathematical objects. In other words, for a sentence A to be true and be reliable it requires the mathematical objects to be in the range of the variables that it will use to prove the sentence A (Quine, 1969). Quine further adds that the singular terms and first-order quantifiers must be ontologically committed and that all the objects used as variables in the process of the proving of its reliability will be needed to be in the range identified. Rayo (2008) has identified and stated that for a sentence to be true in this world, only some and not all objects needs to be in the range of the quantifiers. This single argument involves the ontological commitment which was absent in the case of other arguments. It could also be noted that the first-order and singular term numbers do not simply give rise to ontological commitment by itself. The numbers exist as natural ones and the so called inventions from those numbers have been the further development of the already existing mathematical realm which was hidden and not discovered. There needs to be a theory of assessment which can assess that the truthfulness of a theory commits us to believe the existence of a collection of entities. The argument presented by Quine is weak in its explanation to reach its intended outcome, and does not provide much reliability that could answer all counter claims.