政府幹預與IPO抑價之間的關係一直是證券交易所研究的熱點問題。衆所周知，中國股市經常受到政府政策的嚴格監管。與其他西方國家或地區相比，這些限制表明了更強的限制(Albertini & Barrieu, 2009)。政府在IPO進程的每一步都參與到股票市場活動中，顯示出中國政府的強勢干預(Avadhani, 2010)。政府通過中國證監會對市場運行進行調整，國務院部級事業單位實行聯合管理。特別是政府作爲一些上市公司，即國有企業(SOEs)的幕後推手。本研究旨在探討股權結構的特殊性是否導致中國ipo定價偏低。
雖然現有的很多文獻都討論了ipo定價過低的關係，但沒有一個文獻能夠通過影響ipo定價水平來統一觀點。主要原因可能是政府扮演的雙重角色。一方面，政府監管減少了外部和內部之間的信息不對稱。因此，它緩解了IPO定價過低(Bird & Yeung, 2010)。另一方面，由於政治目的的優先性而非某一領域的利益，政府幹預與定價偏低有關。
IPO抑價(IPO underpricing)通常是指新股發行首日上市後的交易價格高於發行價。大量驗證性文獻發現，成熟資本市場和新興資本市場在新股發行之初都存在IPO定價過低的現象，儘管兩者的差異程度可能不同。一般來說，IPO抑價的原因有兩個方面，一是一級市場的定價明顯偏低(相對於股票的公允價值)，二是市場交易價格中充滿非理性因素(Bird & Yeung, 2010)。許多國外學者認爲，上市首日的收盤價是發行股票的公允價值，爲IPO定價過低，並聲稱上市公司首日收益向投資者承擔風險。之前的理論也有其他的聲音，學者們發現承銷商對新股發行往往持有樂觀的觀點。這也導致了更高的發行價格。股票的公允價值低於噪聲交易者的心理價格。這一現象可能是區分原始IPO價格構成的一種方法，有助於理解原始IPO定價偏低的原因。然而，在實際情況中，真正的原因可能是複雜的。股票價格的公平問題，使得以不合理的方式對藍籌股實際發行水平的IPO市場和二級市場進行定價變得困難。然而，如果發行價格接近或高於股票的真實價格，那麼在IPO中，收益主要來自二級市場。投資者的非理性情緒是由投機泡沫引發的，同時也降低了發行定價。此外，如果發行價格低於上市首日盤價的公允價值，且高於股票的真實價值，則從二級市場泡沫中獲得首日IPO，從而傳遞低定價問題。
The relationship between the government intervention and IPO underpricing remains a hot topic ever since the beginning of the stock exchanges. It is a common knowledge that Chinese stock market is often heavily regulated by the government policy. Such limits indicate a stronger restriction compare to other western countries or regions (Albertini & Barrieu, 2009). The government participates in the stock market activities in every step of the IPO progress that shows the strong intervention of Chinese government (Avadhani, 2010).The government adjusts the market operation through CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission), and the ministerial-level public institutions under the State Council execute a joint administrative function. Particularly, the government acts as the hand behind some listed companies, namely state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The objective of this study is to examine whether the unique situation in ownership structure leads to the underpricing of Chinese IPOs.
Even though much extant literatures discuss the relationship about the underpricing of IPOs, none of them can unify the opinions by influencing the levels. The main reason might be the dual role that government plays. On one hand, government regulations reduce information asymmetry between outsiders and insiders. Therefore, it alleviates IPO underpricing (Bird & Yeung, 2010).On the other hand, government intervention is associated with underpricing due to the priority of political destination rather than the profit of the certain field.
IPO underpricing (underpricing) usually refers to the transaction price which is greater than a market issue price after the issuance of new shares hits the market after the first day. A large number of confirmatory literatures found that both the mature and the emerging capital markets meet IPO underpricing at the beginning of new shares, even though they may differ in the degree of difference. In general, IPO underpricing caused by two aspects of reasons which are the pricing of the primary market substantially that is low (compared with the fair value of the stock) and it consists of full of irrational elements of market transaction price (Bird & Yeung, 2010). Many foreign scholars assume that the closing value of the first day of listing is the fair value of the issued shares for the IPO underpricing and claim that the first-day earnings of listed companies to the investors are taking risks. There are other voices about the previous theories and the scholars found that underwriters often hold optimistic viewpoints about the issue of new shares. It also results in a higher issuing pricing. The fair value of the stocks is shown to be lower than the noise traders’ psychological price. This phenomenon might be a way for differentiating the original IPO price composition that will help understand the causes of IPO underpricing original. However, the real reasons may be complex in the practical situation. The issue of the fair price of the stock makes it difficult to underprice an IPO level market of real blue value and the secondary market in an unreasonable way. However, if the issued prices are close to or above the true price of the stock, then in the IPO, earnings are depicted mainly from the secondary market. The investor’s irrational emotion is triggered by the speculative bubble and also lowers the issuing pricing. Furthermore, if the issue price is lower than the fair value on the first day of listed disk prices and higher than the true value of the stock, then first-day IPO is gained from the secondary market bubble and the issue of low pricing is imparted.