Further ahead, differences of transparency in PPPs end up affecting performance as an evolving and contested issue. The issue becomes more significant when agencies of government do not show concern with specifying the goals and objectives, and measuring and monitoring performance ends up losing the force. This is when performance management is widely adopted in bureaucracies of government (Coghill, 2007). The reinforcement of this trend has been done by the common separation of institution to purchase and provide within the structural framework of government itself.
As a significant example, this includes the development of executive agencies under the control of contract-like agreements of performance with the specification of the desired outputs and sources for assessment of compliance. Considering PPPs, the encouragement of measurement and specification of results cannot be individualised as the only sources for introduction of new levels of accountability and transparency for outcomes and outputs.
The problem with most prominence is regarding transparency and accountability of PPPs when considering the value for money. There is a primary understanding that cost in relation with the project of PPPs can be considered in comparing with in- house provision. This includes if the contracts related to PPPs are within the scope of public interest (Dooren, 2011).
In theoretical terms, while commercial contractors of private sector can be under the assumption to maximum their own profit, the ones on the side of government hold the responsibility for safeguarding the interest of public while the value for money can be secured. In terms of practice, however, members of government often face the pressure in following short term goals and objectives at the expense of wider interests perceived by the public (Coghill, 2007). With respect to long term PPPs, politicians are known to have the electoral incentive for making entry into contracts along with the private sector for the delivery of immediate benefits as services or tangible facilities.
In this context, the costs are postponed well in the years to come. Bureaucrats of treasury who provide their valuable advice have natural predispositions for favourable solution for suitability of short term fiscal agenda across the government. Governments also have a heavy reliability on external consultancy, many of which may have a conflict of interest (Dooren, 2011). Therefore, there is a requirement of transparency for ensuring that there is exposure of governments and advisers to a number of alternate views with key decision of acting as per the public interest.